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ABSTRACT 
 
The defined pension plans of many firms are underfunded.  The Pension Benefits Guaranty 
Corporation was created to protect retirees, but who really benefits? 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
efined benefit pension plans have popped up in the news as more and more employees and retirees 
find that their “guaranteed” retirement plans are not so “guaranteed!”  Workers were reminded of 
the vulnerability of these plans when United Airlines (UA), after declaring bankruptcy, terminated 
its pension funds in 2005 and turned over its pension liabilities to the Pension Benefits Guaranty Corporation 
(PBGC).  The $7.1 billion liability was the largest ever received by PBGC. 
 
PBGC was created to protect the beneficiaries of defined benefit plans.  However after the UA termination, 
questions about the financial condition and viability of defined benefit pension funds have been raised by many – 
including members of Congress.  That is, why did UA feel it was necessary to terminate its plan before it could 
leave bankruptcy?  Data suggest that the pension plan was substantially underfunded and the firm’s future viability 
depended on the offloading of this liability.  So, who benefits from PBGC – the beneficiaries or the firms?   
 
In this paper, we will examine the defined benefit plans of Fortune 500 companies.   The current market 
value of the assets of these plans, the current liability of these plans, the return assumptions used by management for 
funding purposes, the performance of the funds’ investments, and managements’ reactions to shortfalls will be 
analyzed.   
 
PENSION INSURANCE 
 
The Pension Benefits Guaranty Corporation was established by the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974.  The purpose of this Act was to provide security to workers and retirees covered by defined benefit 
plans.  Defined benefit plans promise an annuity to the beneficiaries – the amount usually based on salary and/or 
number of years of service – over their lives.  If an insured plan is terminated, the PBGC takes over the plan and its 
pension liabilities.  It then pays retirees up to the limit set by the law.  Typically this means a reduction (sometimes 
large) in the expected income of retirees.  For example, the four largest terminations in PBGCs history created 
pension liabilities of $18 billion.  PBGC paid 2/3 of the claims handing a $6 billion loss to plan participants.  UAs 
122,541 vested participants, on the other hand, had on average an annual claim of $87,889 while the maximum 
annual payment by PBGC when the plan was terminated was $45,614 – almost a 50 percent reduction in benefits! 
 
There are two types of plans covered by PBGC.  The largest are the “single employer” plans which protect 
34 million workers and retirees in 28,800 different plans.  The others are the “multi-employer” plans which are 
normally created in union negotiations and protect a group of workers such as those in a particular industry.  
Currently 9.9 million workers and retirees in 1,540 plans fall in this category.  As of September 30, 2005, 
underfunding in plans classified as “reasonably possible terminations” or firms with a high degree of default risk 
(normally measured as those with bonds rated below investment grade) amounted to $108 billion.  Total 
underfunding in single employer defined benefit PGBC insured plans exceeded $450 billion. 
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PBGC is not funded by tax-payer dollars, but rather receives its funds through premium payments from 
firms that sponsor insured pension plans.  PBGC invests the premiums (the PBGC fund) and supports its activities 
with income from the fund and balances from terminated plans.  Terminated plans can impact firms which retain 
insurance by depleting the PGCB fund and causing premiums to be increased.  The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 
reflects this reality, and raised premiums for both single-employee and multi-employee plans.  This increased the 
cost of “doing business” for well run firms. 
 
PENSION PLAN FUNDING 
 
To examine the financial viability of defined benefit funds, we can look at the condition of Fortune 500 
firms.  As shown in Table 1,
1
 238 firms were overfunded in 2000 versus 110 underfunded firms.  The market 
turndown and recession beginning in 2001 reversed this relationship and by 2004, 55 were overfunded versus 319 
underfunded plans.  Estimates suggest that this relationship will continue to deteriorate.  Funding status (the ratio of 
plan assets to obligations) decreased from 123 percent to an expected 87 percent in 2006. 
 
 
Table 1
Changing Fund Status of Fortune 500 Companies
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005e 2006e
Number of Companies Overfunded 238 122 35 50 55 42 45
Number of Companies Underfunded 110 237 335 320 319 325 322
Plan Assets $1,168 $1,040 $950 $1,138 $1,268 $1,243 $1,264
Pension Benefit Obligation (PBO) $948 $1,031 $1,168 $1,314 $1,433 $1,461 $1,448
Funded Status $ $220 $9 -$218 -$176 -$165 -$218 -$183
 Funded Status % 123% 101% 81% 87% 89% 85% 87%  
 
 
CAUSES OF UNDERFUNDING 
 
What has caused this change?  Part of the answer is found in how defined pension plans are structured.  
Each year the firm and/or participants contribute money to a fund which invests the dollars in money and/or capital 
market securities.  The amount contributed is based on three factors.  First is the life expectancy of the participant 
after retirement.  That is, how many years will the participant draw the promised annuity.  Second is the size of the 
expected annuity.  That is, how large is the promised annuity – again size is typically based on salary and/or years of 
service.  Third is the expected return that the invested funds will earn over the working life of the participant.  That 
is, as annual contributions are received, what return will the invested funds earn prior to withdrawal by the retiree. 
 
Firms make assumptions as to these three values.  While data is available to help estimate the first two, the 
third assumption is critical and uncertain.  Table 2 shows the median assumption of investment return and the actual 
return earned by invested funds.  In five out of the seven years reported (including expected values), the actual 
return on invested pension funds was below the assumptions on which contributions were calculated.  In two of 
these years assumed returns exceeded actual returns by 16 percent!   
 
It is important to remember that defined benefit pension plan funds should be invested in fairly sound 
securities.  Participants are expecting to receive the promised annuities at retirement.  So, the contributions should 
not be invested in overly risky securities.  Table 2 shows that in years when the return on short-term Treasury 
securities hovered around 1 percent, firms were basing their pension contributions on an assumed return above 8 
percent. 
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Table 2
Pension Fund Performance of Fortune 500 Companies
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005e 2006e
No. Firms w/ Pretax Pension Income 144 144 91 45 22 32 32
No. Firms w/Pretax Pension Expense 195 204 267 320 344 339 339
After-Tax Pension—% of Net Income* -2.00% -2.00% 1.00% 4.00% 4.00% 3.00% 2.00%
Median Expected Return 9.31% 9.25% 8.80% 8.50% 8.35% 8.35% 8.35%
Median Actual Return 4.34% -5.96% -8.86% 18.06% 11.48% 2.00% 7.17%
Median Liability Discount Rate 7.50% 7.25% 6.25% 6.10% 5.75% 5.75% 6.00%
Median Salary Inflation Rate 4.50% 4.50% 4.15% 4.00% 4.00% 4.00% 4.00%
Note: Income is shown as a negative and Expense as a postive number.
 
 
The period 2000 – 2005 was a volatile time for the markets.  Table 3 compares the median expected and 
actual returns on Fortune 500 companies’ pension funds (from Table 2 above) to the actual performance of a series 
of Vanguard Index Funds.
2
  The selected funds include both bond and stock funds.  The return on the Fortune 500 
Index illustrates the lackluster performance of these firms as returns in three of the six years were negative.  It also 
reflects the volatility they faced.  Returns increased by approximately 50 percent between 2002 and 2003, increasing 
from a return of -22.15 percent to 28.50 percent.  The last column of the table gives the arithmetic average of returns 
over the six year period.  It is interesting to note that only three funds averaged the expected returns of the pension 
funds during this period – both long-term bond funds and Mid-Cap Growth.  It is also interesting to note that the 
actual return on pension funds was the third lowest return earned.  Only the Large Blend Cap and Fortune 500 index 
earned lower returns during the period. 
 
 
Table 3
Market Performance
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Average
Pension Fund Median Expected Return 9.31% 9.25% 8.80% 8.50% 8.35% 8.35% 8.76%
Pension Fund Median Actual Return 4.34% -5.96% -8.86% 18.06% 11.48% 2.00% 3.51%
500 Index -9.06% -12.02% -22.15% 28.50% 10.74% 4.77% 0.13%
Long-term Government Bonds 19.72% 4.31% 16.67% 2.68% 7.12% 6.61% 9.52%
Long-term Bonds 16.63% 8.17% 14.35% 5.50% 8.40% 5.32% 9.73%
Large Blend Cap -8.97% -11.13% -21.92% 30.15% 11.11% 5.82% 0.84%
Mid-cap Blend -15.51% -9.17% -18.06% 43.43% 18.71% 10.29% 4.95%
Large Value 13.57% -2.34% -15.65% 25.14% 13.57% 4.37% 6.44%
Mid-cap Growth 18.04% -9.68% -27.94% 49.55% 21.65% 8.27% 9.98%
 
 
With the short-fall in funding expected to continue, firms should be taking actions to manage their pension 
funds.  Short-falls can be eliminated in one of two ways – by either decreasing the expected payouts to the retirees 
or by increasing the amount of money employees contribute to their retirement fund.  Which of these actions is 
management taking? 
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DECREASED EXPECTATIONS? 
 
If defined benefit pension plans are underfunded, management can reduce this problem by decreasing 
expected payouts in the future.  This can be accomplished by changing the plan from a defined benefit to a defined 
contribution plan or by reducing the number of retirees through buyouts.  
 
The most notable firm to change the form of its pension plan was IBM.  In January 2006, IBM announced 
that it would end its defined benefits plan as of January 2008.
3
  They stated that the current defined benefit plan 
would be replaced with a redesigned 401K plan.  A 401K plan is a defined contribution plan.  With this type of plan, 
the contribution is fixed, but the amount available at retirement depends on the returns earned by the invested 
contributions.  IBM announced it would increase its contribution to a maximum of 10 percent of the employees’ 
salary and provide for 100 percent participation.  The stated rationale for the change was to better control retirement 
costs by creating a more predictable cost structure.  A defined contribution plan allows a firm to better control its 
pension costs because the uncertainty of market returns is borne by the retiree, not the firm. 
 
A notable example of the second is General Motors (GM).  In March 2006, GM announced a plan to 
buyout its workers.
4
  Employees’ possible payout depended on years of service.  If the individual had worked for 
GM for less than 10 years, he/she could receive up to $70,000 if they would retire and severe all ties – no retirement 
benefits.  If the individual had worked for GM between 10 and 26 years, the possible payout increased to a 
maximum of $140,000 if retirement benefits were surrendered.  This plan would allow GM to substantially reduce 
its costs.  Because of union contracts, the average worker costs GM $130,000 per year.  If the employee takes early 
retirement, the cost drops to $50,000 per year.  After the employee qualifies for Social Security and Medicare, the 
cost drops to $20,000 per year.  A large number of employees – 35,000 – took the buyout.  Many analysts believe 
this cost savings will increase the viability of GM and help it return to profitability. 
 
INCREASED FUNDING? 
 
If defined benefit pension plans are underfunded, management can reduce this problem by increasing their 
contribution to the fund.  This can be accomplished by diverting cash from other actions such as cash dividends and 
stock repurchases – both of which should benefit shareholders.  So, the question is have Fortune 500 firms held 
dividends steady(decreases in dividends typically lead to large drops in stock price and would not be expected) to 
provide cash for pension fund contributions?  Or have firms reduced the amount of cash they have spent on 
repurchasing outstanding common stock?   
 
In 2003, 14 percent of firms increased their dividend payout and in 2004, 7 percent increased their dividend 
payout.
5
  The increased dividend payouts were a reaction to changes in the personal income tax laws which went 
into effect in 2003.  At that time, the top federal tax rate on most dividends paid to individuals was reduced from 
38.6 percent to 15 percent – the lowest rate since World War I.  Firms reacted by increasing their payouts to 
shareholders even as the number of underfunded plans became dangerously high.  It appears that management 
decided to reward shareholders at the expense of workers and retirees.  The question is did insurance provided by 
PGBS allow or encourage them to take this action? 
 
Repurchase of outstanding shares benefit shareholders by providing them with cash (if they sell) or 
increasing the value of their shares (if they don’t).  Repurchases may also benefit management by reducing the 
number of shares outstanding if a shareholder is attempting to gain control of the company.  Companies on the 
Standard & Poor’s 500 stock index announced $164 billion in stock repurchases in the first two quarters of 2005.  
Many analysts believe the repurchases are being driven by a one-year tax break which allows U.S. companies to 
repatriate huge sums from overseas.  While the law does not allow for repatriated cash to be used for repurchases, 
companies are not required to isolate the profits brought back or pledge them to certain activities.  Again it appears 
that management decided to reward shareholders – and themselves – at the expense of pension plans.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
So, what does this mean?  PBCGs future exposure to probable terminations declined in 2006 from 2005 
estimates.  The health of pension funds was helped by several years of double-digit investment gains and rising 
interest rates.  However, the shortfall still stands at $73 billion and many plans are still at risk for termination.  In 
addition, it is estimated that on average 64 percent of pension assets are invested in the stock market – suggesting 
another market downturn could again wreak havoc with pension funding.
6
   If the plans are terminated, retirees can 
expect a sometimes significant decrease in retirement income.   
 
And, what is management doing to reduce this shortfall?  Some firms are reducing their future retirement 
liabilities.  They are either switching from defined benefits to defined contribution plans or encouraging employees 
to walk away from retirement benefits through buyouts.  Evidence suggests that firms are not diverting additional 
cash into funds to decrease the shortfall.  Instead, it appears that firms have increased dividend and repurchase 
payouts to shareholders while continuing to increase the risk to workers and retirees.   
 
What this means to retirees then is more risk and uncertainty about the future.  If plans are terminated, 
retirees face greatly reduced retirement income.  If defined benefit plans are replaced with defined contribution 
plans, workers face more uncertainty as to retirement income.  Retirement income will depend on market returns. 
 
The future looks less favorable for retirees.  Or, there goes that retirement home on the 18
th
 hole. 
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